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During the past decade, Congress has passed a
major body of legislation to regulate industrial
air, water, and solid-waste pollution. This legisla-
tion 'encompasses the Radiation Control for
Health and Safety Act (1968), The National En-
vironmental Policy Act (1969), the Clean Air
Act Amendments (1970), the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (1970), and the Federal
\Vater Pollution Control Act (1972).1 Virtually
aU private industry in thenation has been affect-
edby this proliferation of government regula-
tions. Thus, the private sector's capital-
investment requirements for pollution-control
equipment could reach $112 billion over the dec-
ade 1972~81. Again, sixindustries, (non-ferrous
metals, steel, paper, chemicals, petroleum, and
electrical utilities) have allocated more than 10
percent oftheir total plant-equipment expendi-
tures for pollution control and abatement during
the 1972-76 period. And again, firms might have
to inyest $31 billion simply to meet the 85-deci-
bel noise limit which the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency has recommended for work areas.2
Costs, ofthis magnitude should increase the rates
of return required on new investment, and thus
could tend to reduce the total amount of capital
formation in the economy.3
Because pollution-control standards may-in-
deed, will--change in the future in some un-
known way, business firms have hesitated to
make forward commitments. This basic uncer-
tainty, along with thenecessity'ofpreparingenvi-
ronmental-impact reports, has tended to delay
new construction projects and to lengthen con-
struction periods. As one noted economist said
when discussing Dow Chemical's decision to
drop its plans for a massive petro-chemical com-
plex: "Wehave created a nightmare with the per-
mit process. The problem is having some
certainty as to what rules are and will be. Right
now, you get a permit, or you take a couple of
years and you think you've got a permit, and then
you really haven't: you've got another two
years."4
Since 1967, five industries (petroleum, chemi-
cals, paper, steel, and nonferrous metals) have
accounted for over 40 percent of all required in-
dustrial spending on pollution control.5 This arti-
cle attempts to measure the extent to which
pollution-control standards have protracted the
investment processes for industries. Theevidence
suggests that the time lag between capital appro-
priations and final expenditures for those indus-
tries as a group has been extended at least four
quarters, with spending of roughly 15 percent of
initial capital appropriations occurring over the
additional quarters. The evidence also suggests
that a considerable alteration in the time pattern
ofplant relative to equipmentspending has taken
place over the past decade.
Section I presents a model for the investment
process. Section II presents the framework for
our statistical model, and Section III provides
the estimated results. Section IV presents a sum-
mary and conclusions.
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40I•. The Investment Process
Assume aninitial condition oflong-term equi-
librium,where the capital stock is adjustedtoa
given state of technology and to given supply-
and-demand conditions in product and factor
markets. Then, let the industry's desired stock of
capital increase for some reason-perhapsdue to
a fall in interest rates orto an increase in demand
fortheproduct. The adjustment to a new equilib-
riumwill not be immediate, and capital invest-
ment will not be concentrated at one point in
time but rather spread over a period oftime. The
available evidence indeed indicates that the in-
vestment response to a change in demand for
capital stock is distributed over several years.BIt
takes time to plan capital outlays, arrange for fi-
nancing, let construction contracts, order equip-
ment, build or manufacture the ordered items,
and construct the new facilities. In addition,
business firms in an uncertain world are often re-
luctant to adjust production facilities immediate-
ly and fully to new market conditions. "They
prefer to make a partial initial adjustment and
wait to see if the new conditions persist before
undertaking further expansion."7
Given the lag between changes in desired cap-
ital and final investment expenditures, the in-
vestment process can be characterized as a
sequence of separate stages. The first stage in-
volves a change in the demand for capital stock,
and encompasses initial capital budgeting
and planning process. The second stage covers
the appropriations process in which the. capital
budgetisdisaggregated anq "testedbyindividual
project." When top management authoriz.es.a
capital appropriation, it decides either to. cOr-
roborate or change the capital budget. The. ap-
proval of capital appropriations therefore
formalizes planning decisions for each block of
capital spending.s The third stage involves the
letting of contracts for plant and equipment.
Then, in the final stage, funds are expended for
received capital goods.
Since the second stage encompasses a formal-
ized business-planning process-involving con-
tinuous spending decisions and changes in those
decisions-we assume that actual capital expen-
ditures accrue entirely from previous appropri-
ations. In other words, an expenditure (denoted
here as Et) is a weighted average of past appro-
priations made during the'second stage. If Wi is
the proportion of projects initiated in time t and
completed in time t + i, then
Et = woAt + WIAt-l+ ... + WiAt-i (1)
where At is the appropriation made in time t.
The weights Wi are non-negative and, in the ab-
sence of cancellation of appropriations, sum to
unity,
II. Development of Model
We use multiple correlation to estimate the
weights Wi, where an expenditure at time t is de-
termined by past appropriations. We assume
thatan·appropriationmademorethan n periods
pastcanbe neglected, so thatequation (1) can be
rewritten as
n
Et = ~ WiAt-i + et (2)
i = 0
where itiscustomarilyassumed that the exoge-
nousvariables At-i are independent ofthe error
term et. However, multiple correlation will yield
unreliable results when successive observations
At, At-I, ... , etc. are too collinear, as is the
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case with tht< quarterly Conference Board data
used in this study. In order to reduce the difficul-
ties of multi-collinearity, we assume that final
expenditures accrue entirely from previousap~
propriations made duringthe second stage inthe
investment processandrestrictWi "" 0 fori ::::: = 1.
Secondly, since we assume that an appropriation
made more than n periods ago will have only a
negligible<effect On Et,
the successive weights Wi lie on a polynomial of
degree k. 9
In the final form, ourstatistical modelincludes
a constant term and a variable defined as the ra-(3)
tio of opening-quarter appropriations backlogs
(BL) at time t over expenditures at time t - 1. 10
The constant term is included because the cap-
itaI-appropriations survey data contain an
allowance for overstatement and understate-
ment,ll and also becausesome companies inclu.d-
ed in the survey report only majorexpenditu.res
as appropriated.12
The (BLtlEt - 1) variable compensates for
the delayed spending resulting from changes in
thebusiness cycle by shifting the lag distribution,
n
( ~ WiAt - i ), forward-i.e., it raises the esti-
i =0
mated values ofthe initial weights and lowers the
values of the later weights.13 "Postponements
may also occur after the formal approval by the
board ofdirectors. Then, as the survey is present-
ly constituted, we would not be formally awareof
it. However, ifsuch development were to become
widespread, as in a recession, for example, it
would show up as a relative rise in the backlog of
appropriations with declining expenditures and
commitments."14 The ratio not only reflects these
cyclical changes, but also adjusts for the delayed
expenditures resulting from the unanticipated
impact of the energy crisis. 15
Autocorrelation has been a problem with pre-
vious studies using capital appropriationsand ex-
pendituresdata.16 Tocorrect for this problem, we
transformed the data using the Cochrane-Orcutt
iterative technique. The final form of our equa-
tion thus is
n
Et =C +b(BLt/Et - 1) + ~ WiAt - i + Ut·
i = 0
where quarterly Conference Boarddata on cap-
ital appropriations, expenditures, and appropri-
ations backlogs are seasonally adjusted and in
constantdollars.
Parameters for our distributed-lag regression
model are estimated.for the five industries---sin-
gly and in theaggregate-whichhave accounted
for over 40 percentofall industrial anti-pollution
spending since 1967. These industries-petrole-
um, chemicals, paper, steel, and nonferrous met-
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als-are classified as industries.
The data cover the sample period 1953 1-1976
IV and two subperiods--one preceding, and one
following, the passage of pollution-control legis-
lation 0953 1- 1976 IV and 1967 1- 1976 IV).
Following estimation of a test is
performed to determine whether there is a sig-
nificant change in coefficient values between the
two subperiods. The regression model is then
reestimated for each and the industry
aggregate, to determine whether the number of
elements in the distribution increased be-
tween the two subperiods.
Because ofthe probability that changes in esti-
mated lag distributions reflect factors which are
independent ofpollution-control legislation, esti-
mated results for "Regulated" group are com-
pared with estimated results for a "Control"
group of industries that have been minimally af-
fected by standards-specifi-
cally, electrically machinery, other nondurables,
textile mill products, and transportation (exclud-
ing motor vehicles). These were the four indus-
tries in the McGraw-Hili pollution-control
expenditures survey which maintained the lowest
percentages of anti-pollution spending to total
capital expenditures over the 1970-76 periodY
Pollution-control amounted to 4.1
pel'celllt of total spending for the "Con-
trol" group from 1970 to 1976, versus 14.0 per-
cent for the group and 5.4 percent
for all industries surveyed by McGraw-Hill.18
Pollution-control expenditures as a percentageof
capital spending for individual industries (and
group aggregates), and also as a percentage of
total industrial anti-pollution spending, are pre-
sented in Tables Al and A2.
The industries in the "Control" group were not
lations. In other words, these regulations have
accounted for a of a in the time
lag between capital appropriations and final ex-
penditures for that group. Adjusting increases in
the lengths of the "Regulated" group lag-distri-
bution will therefore cause a understate-
ment of the extent to which pollution-control
standards have protracted the investment pro-
cess.III. Empirical Results
Beforeestirnatingthe coefficients (wi)andde-
termining values for npertaiIling to each indus-
tryand aggregate, we had to make an arbitrary
decision regarding the value ofk (the degree of
the polynomial). 19 The initial value was set at 4
and n = 6, 7, " . , 19 were tested for each indus-
try angaggregate forthe 19531- 1976IV sam-
ple period. From among these 15 .estimated
distributedlags, one was chosen as "best" for
each industry and aggregate using the follo\Ving
two criteria: (1) R2 (the coefficient of multiple
determination adjusted for degrees offreedom),
and. (2)elimiIlation .of those.. distributedlags
whose Iaterw~ights are.negative..•. Once the
"best" distril:mted .Iag was selected.for each. .in-
dustry and. aggre~ate, the.process. wasrep~ated
for the two aggregates setting k=2and 3tode-
termine if there was. an improvement in R2. In
both cases, R2 deteriorated for those values. oLk.
All results reported in thisstudyare thereforede-
rived using 4th degree polynomials.20 Actual ex-
penditures and values estimated using the "best"
Chart 1
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1968 1970 1972 1974 1976distributed lag regressions are plotted for the
"Regulated" and "Control" aggregates in Chart
1.
Since we hypothesize thattheinvestment pro-
cess for "Regulated" industries has lengthened as
a consequence of pollution-control standards, it
follows that any such alteration should be re-
flected in a change in estimated coeffiCient val-
ues between the two subperiods. Using the same
values for n determined for the"best" distributed
lag regressions over the entire sample· period
19531-1976 IV, coefficients arereestimatedfor
each industry and aggregate over the twosllb-
samples. These individual regressions are used to
test this hypothesis as against the null-hypothesis
(equal coefficients in both subperiods).
A comparison ofthe sums ofsquared residuals
from the regressions estimated for the entire
sample period with those estimated for the two
sub-samples yields F561 = 10.22 for the "Regulat-
ed" aggregate and PS61 = 3.44 for the "Control"
aggregate, with an f561 - critical = 2.12 at the
one-percent level of confidence.21 The F-tests
thus support the alternative hypothesis, which
denotes a change in coefficient values between
the early and later subperiods. The alternative
hypothesis was also accepted at the one-percent
level of confidence for each of the individual in-
dustries composing the "Regulated" and "Con-
trol" aggregates. Since both groups exhibit
significant alterations in coefficient values be-
tween subperiods, we may conclude that invest-
ment activity is affected by other factors besides
pollution-control regulations. However, these
regulations must be responsible for at least some
ofthe change in estimated coefficient values, be-
cause the "Control" industries are not complete-
ly free from their direct and indirect effects.
Next, we estimate the impact ofpollution-con-
trol standards on the time lag between capital ap-
propriations and expenditures, exclusive of the
impact ofother factors operating during the last
decade. We again test regression equations for n
=6, 7, ... , 19 for both·groupsofindustries, se-
lect the "best' distributed lag, and COmpare the
changes in the mean lags and in the orders ofthe
estimated distributed lags between the two sub-
periods.22 The two criteria specified earlier are
used in selecting the "best" distributed lags for
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each industry and aggregate. Regression results
for the early and later subperiods are presented
in Tables 1 and 2, while plots of the "best" dis-
tributed lags are shown in Chart 2.
The results indicate a shift from an inverted
"v" shaped distribution in the early periodio a
bi-modal distribution in the later subperiod. This
suggests that an appropriation in the 1953-66
subperiod led to a symmetrically distributed set
of expenditures over time for plant and equip-
ment, while an appropriation in the 1967-76 sub-
period led to quite a different distribution. In this
later period, we see an initially higher percentage
of expenditures on equipment-indicated by the
left-skewed distribution in six of the individual
industries as well as the "Regulated" aggre-
gate-with a longer, and in the case of both
group aggregates, a somewhat separate distribu-
tion reflecting delayed expenditures for plant.
This explanation is consistent with the fact that
the plant shareoftotal appropriations for "Regu-
lated" industries (except petroleum) fell from
25.93 percent in the early subperiod to 20.96 per-
cent in the later subperiod. Again, because
spending for plant involves longer and greater
capital outlays than spending for equipment, it
follows that final appropriations for new plant
are subject to relatively longer delays and higher
postponement rates because of all the uncertain-
ties that have characterized the past decade-in-
cluding the uncertainties attendant pollution-
control regulations.
In the case ofthe "Control" aggregate, an esti-
mated 100 percent of appropriations were spent
by the eighth quarter in the early subperiod. In
contrast, only 81 percent of appropriations were
spent by the eighth quarter in the later subper-
iod, with an estimated 13.5 percent being spent
over the following three quarters. The meanJag
increased from 3.302 quarters in the early sub-
period to 3.936 quarters in the later subperiod.
Both the number of periods in the lag distribu-
tions and the estimated mean lags pertaining to
the four individual "Control" industries regis-
tered similar increases. Electrical rnachinery reg-
istered the smallest increase, and transportation
equipment the largest increase, between the two
subperiods.
In the case of the "Regulated" aggregate, anTable 1
"Best". Di$tributed Lags
Early.Subperiod (1953.1--1966JV)
"Regulated" Group "Control" Group
.897 0.880 .794 .849 .871 .871 1.000 .952 .931 .971 .777
3.120 4.403 3.768 3.012 4.402 2.435 3.302 3.265 2.515 2.740 1.853
.42 .52 .69 .25 .56 .44 .70 .35 .63 .13 .00
.98 .85 .97 .98 .96 .87 .98 .97 86 .97 .97
1.49 1.88 1.27 1.66 1.85 2.00 2.31 2.22 1.36 1.81 2.00
77.01 52.77 10.00 23.03 12.90 66.70 23.91 16.85 6.25 6.31 12.14
Electri-
Chemi- cal
"Regu- Primary Primary cals Paper & "Con- Machi- Other Textile Trans-
lated Iron Non.. & Allied Allied trol" nery Non- Mill portation
Aggre- and Ferrous Pro- Pro- Petrole- Aggre- & dura- Pro- Equip-
gate Steel Metals ducts ducts um gate Equip. bles ducts ment2
c 355.156 67.327 49.587 139.083 -12.140 -22.358 -48.561 38.723 -9.536 -0.393 59.227
(1.135) (0.744) (1.669) (3.080) (-0.465) (-0.173) (-0.651) (1.187) (-0.720) (-0.047) (5.907)
-74.209 -5.170 -3.446 -21.066 5.652 7.560 4.926 -9.217 -1.723 0.153 -14.678
(-0.913) (-0.633) (-1.599) (-1.706) (0.945) (0.143) (-0.390) (-1.842) (-1.347) (0.137) (-3.267)
0.048 0.035 0.058 0.075 0.032 0.0830.111 0.133 0.0120.076 0.102
(1.032) (0.749) (3.148) (3.017) (0.934) (1.224) (4.974) (9.270) (1.384) (3.758) (2.993)
0.114 0.070 0.095 0.127 0.067 0.162 0.157 0.179 0.127 0.155 0.205
(2.784) (1.517) (4.893) (6.064) (1.891) (2.891) (8.734) (12.745) (3.588) (11.572) (6.500)
0.1680.099 0.113 0.154 0.098 0.2060.161 0.170 0.2240.2060.234
(8.012) (3.152) (8.343) (11.482) (4.521) (5.481) (15.320) (21.194) (6.380) (10.518) (7.737)
0.190 0.119 0.118 0.157 0.120 0.200 0.145 0.134 0.255 0.214 0.173
(7.309) (4.117) (8.716) (8.713) (7.192) (4.797) (7.966) (15.069) (6.210) (9.604) (8.101)
0.1760.129 0.112 0.139 0.131 0.1470.123 0.090 0.2040.176 0.061
(5.161) (3.229) (5.820) (7.090) (5.115) (3.833) (5.547) (6.242) (3.444) (11.092) (1.223)
0.128 0.127 0.099 0.106 0.129 0.068 0.102 0.054 0.105 0.107
(4.275) (2.845) (4.358) (6.854) (4.504) (1.610) (5.488) (3.256) (2.591) (3.813)
0.063 0.114 0.080 0.064 0.114 0.001 0.086 0.033 0.034
(2.341) (2.814) (3.668) (3.615) (4.944) (0.026) (4,231) (2.269) (0.920)
0.007 0.091 0.059 0.025 0.090 0.071 0.028
(0.264) (2.459) (3.099) (1.191) (4.699) (2.264) (2.358)
0.062 0.038 0.059 0.047 0.037

























I Distributed-lag weights quarters
2 Excluding motor vehicles
45Table 2
"Best".Distributed Lags




"Regu- Primary Primary cals Paper & "Con- Machi- Other Textile Trans-
lated Iron Non- & Allied Allied trol" nery Non- Mill portation
Aggre- and Ferrous Pro- Pro- Petrole- Aggre- & dura- Pro... Equip-
gate Steel Metals ducts ducts um gate Equip. bles ducts menl2
7,123 -14,258 88,847 9,439 80,882 -1.517 -35.519 -141.047 31.056 3.241 17.941
(0.028) (-0,135) (3.194) (0.171 ) (0.756) (-0.018) (-0.136) (-0,558) (2,125) (0.086) (0.324)
BLjEt_, -58.508 -0.042 -19,900 -20.751 -11.586 -11.700 -5.323 11.868 -8.326 -2.994 -2,800
Weight I (-1,452) (-0.006) (-4.887) (1.412) (-1.327) (-0.653) (-0.398) (0.738) (-2.370) (-1.128) (-0,531)
0 0.066 0.046 0.103 0,080 0.051 0.024 0.105 0.090 0.102 0,123 0,083
(7.266) (5.720) (9,018) (10,906) (3,403) (1.493) (5.142) (3,879) (4.954) (5,057) (2.031)
0.100 0.073 0,132 0.123 0,076 0.052 0,148 0.131 0,134 0,172 0.131
(8,493) (6,696) (10.027) (12,497) (3.537) (2,750) (5,778) (4.296) (6.513) (6.306) (3.288)
2 0.112 0.087 0,152 0.138 0,083 0,079 0.148 0,140 0.129 0.173 0.151
(10.621) (8.197) (11.761 ) (15,156) (3.677) (5,437) (6.689) (4.772) (8.790) (7.281 ) (6.896)
0.109 0,090 0,121 0,135 0,077 0.102 0,126 0,128 0.112 0,147 0,150
(14,737) (10,498) (14,767) (20,218) (3.750) (12.014) (7.683) (5.042) (7.697) (5,964) (7,585)
4 0,096 0,086 0.096 0.118 0,064 0.116 0,096 0.106 0,099 0, III 0.135
(20.891) (13,104) (14,210) (30,145) (3.563) (15.398) (7.420) (4,582) (5,984) (3,927) (4.217)
0,080 0.079 0.049 0.096 0.048 0.120 0.066 0,082 0.095 0.076 0,112
(16,479) (12.908) (5,490) (28.682) (2.905) (11.372) (5.374) (3.506) (6.597) (2.661) (3.200)
6 0.064 0,070 0,011 0.072 0.033 0,114 0.046 0.061 0,099 0.050 0,084
(10.001) (10,100) (1,040) (14.708) (1.999) (10.004) (3,566) (2,525) (7.921) (1.934) (2,901)
0,051 0.061 0.010 0,051 0.022 0,099 0.036 0,047 0,100 0.Q35 0.056
(7.393) (7.882) (0,940) (8.321 ) (1.300) (10.773) (2.442) (1,879) (5.783) (1.364) (1,853)
0.043 0.053 0.001 0,034 0.016 0.077 0.Q38 0,042 0.076 0.027 0.031
(7,191 ) (6.583) (1.715) (5.534) (0.986) (11.395) (1.851 ) (1.492) (,4.219) (0,950) (0.739)
9 0.039 0.048 0.003 0,023 0.017 0,051 0.045 0.042 0.019 0.012
(8.942) (5,599) (0.419) (4,522) (1.085) (5.213) (1.661 ) (1.283) (0,787) (0.299)
10 0.040 0.044 0.023 0.019 0.024 0,025 0,050 0,046
(7.531 ) (4.464) (1.971 ) (4.856) (1,542) (1.837) (1.653) (1.197)
II 0.043 0,042 0.056 0.020 0.036 0,006 0.040 0,046
(4.873) (3.401 ) (2.950) (4.328) (2.000) (0.495) (1.705) (1.184)
12 0.()46 0,041 0.086 0,025 0,052 0,034
(3.735) (2.680) (3.426) (3,485) (2.190) (1.204)
13 0,043 0.039 0,098 0.Q31 0.068
(3,242) (2,253) (3,727) (3,190) (2,243)
14 0.030 0.033 0.076 0.032 0.082
(3.009) (2.007) (3942) (3.143) (2.243)







Coefs, .971 .918 1.045 1.018 ,976 .871 .948 .999 .951 .939 0,950
Mean
Lag 5,498 6.179 5.251 4,863 8.653 5.033 3,936 4,441 3,700 2;918 3,424
RHO .526 ,53 .13 .13 .80 .25 .22 .61 .06 -0,15 .37
'R2 .99 .96 .91 .98 .91 .97 ,83 .84 .92 .74 .91
D.W. 1.49 1.97 2,01 2.03 1.49 1.72 1.83 1.78 1.95 2.03 1.89
S.E. 85.93 27.54 27,56 27.949 22.46 58.55 38,73 33,48 13,49 11,89 16,90
I Distributed-lag weights for quarters




































47estimated 90 percent of appropnatIOns were
spent by the seventh quarter in theearlys~bper~
iod -butonly 68 percent ofappropriations were
spent by the seventh quarter in the later subper~
iod, with 28 percent more being spent over the
following seven quarters. The modal period~the
period of greatest expenditures-is the third
quarter in the early subperiod, but the distribu~
tion then becomes bi~modal in the later subper~
iod, with peak spending centered in the second
and twelfth quarters. In contrast to the "Con~
trol" aggregate, the "Regulated" aggregate has
its first spending peak in the later period cen-
tered to the left ofthe mode pertaining to the ear~
Iier sample period.
The increases in the order (Lln), the mean lag
(Lle), and the total percentage of expenditures
delayed in the later subperiod (%ED) are pre~
sented in Table 3. The impact of pollutiorH::on~
trol regulations is derived by comparing the
values calculated for each ofthe "Regulated" in~
dustries with those calculated for the "Control"
aggregate. The paper industry shows by far the
largest percentage of delayed expenditures, fol~
lowed by primary nonferrous metals, primary
iron and steel, petroleum and chemicals.
All the industries in both groups experienced
increases over time in the number of periods in
their respective lag distributions. Because "Con~
trol" industries were subject to at least some pol~
lution-control regulations, some portion of the
increases in the number of periods in "Control"
Table 3
Estimated Total Changes in e, n, and %ED




e (%Eol ~n ~e (%EQl --- 2.378 28.4 4 1.744 14.9
1.776 26.8 4 1.142 13.3
1.483 33.9 2 0.849 20.4
1.851 20.8 5 1.217 7.3
4.251 48.2 5 3.617 34.7








fl €l n e
"Regulated" aggregate 3.120 14 5.498
Primary iron and steel 8 4.403 IS 6.179
Primary non-ferrous metals 9 3.768 14 5.251
Chemicals and allied products 7 3.012 15 4.863
Paper and allied products 9 4.402 17 8.653
Petroleum 6 2.435 II 5.033
"Control" aggregate 8 3.302 II 3.936
Electrical machinery and equip. 10 3.265 12 4.441
Other non-durables 5 2.515 8 3.700
Textile mill products 6 2.740 9 2.918
Transportation equip.
(excluding motor vehicles) 6 1.853 9 3.424














Due to Pollution Control
Regulations1(1967-76) subperiod, using the formula
2;i w' '
I
group lag distributions can therefore be attribut-
ed tothedirect and indirect effects ofthoseregu-
lations. We therefore hypothesized that (ceteris
paribus) the higher ratio of an industry's anti- ~w i
pollution spending to its total capital spending, I
the larger theincreaseovertime in the numberof Next we derive the industry rankings for the
periods in the lag distribution-and the higher mean lag (8) and for the ratio of antipollution
the percentage ofappropriations spent over pro- spending to total capital spending (Table4). Our
tracted periods. hypothesis is strongly supported by the Spear-
To test this hypothesis, we first compute the man rank correlation coefficient (rho), which is
mean lag (8) of the percentage of appropri- computed to be .75 and is significant at the 2.5-
ations spent over protracted periods in the later percent level.24
Table 4
Ranking of Industries According To (1) Anti-pollution
Expenditures/Total Capital Expenditures and (2) Mean lag (i5 )
Industry
Primary iron and steel
Primary non-ferrous metals
Chemicals and allied products
Paper and allied products
Petroleum

















































IV. Summary and Conclusions
The basic hypothesis tested in this paper is that
the investment process for industries which have
incurred heavy anti-pollution expenditures has
been prolonged, partly becauseofthe petniitpro-
cessitselfandpartly because ofthe increased in-
vestment uncertainty engendered by both the
unpredictability of future legislation and the
case-by-caseapplicationof pollution controls.
Parameters for a distributed-lag investment
function incorporating capital appropriations
and final expenditures were estimated for two
groups of industries for the sample period 1953
1--1976 IV, which covers the periods before and
after the implementation of .pollution-control
legislation. The first of the two groups is com..
posed of five industries which accounted for
more than 40percent ofall industrial anti-pollu-
tionspending over the pastdecade. Because of
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the probability that some portion ofan observed
increase in the appropriations/expenditures time
lag is due to factors independent of pollution-
controllegislation, parameters were also estimat-
ed for a second group composed of four indus-
tries negligibly affected by polluti()n c()ntrols.
Estimated parameters for bothgroups wer.e test-
e<l todetermine structuralchallgesinQlltjnyest-
ment model between the subperio<ls. . The
evidence suggested that thereisach~nge.inesti-
mated coefficient values between subperiods for
both groups.
In order to. estimate the impactofpollution-
controlstandardson the timelagbetweencapital
appropriations and final expenditures, estimated
changes for the minimally-affected group were
used to adjust the estimated increaseSiovertime
in the mean lag and in the number ofperiods be-tween appropriations artd expenditures forthe
five industries heavily affected by pollution-con-
trol standards. Empiricalevidence indicates that,
for the five heavily-affected industries, roughly
15 percentofappropriatedexpenditures werede-
layed over a periodoffour quarters du.etouncer-
tainty and the permit process. The paper
industry'experiencedthemostseveredelays,with
34.7 percentofexpenditures postponedovera<pe-
riod of five quarters, while petroleum suffered
thesmallest delays, with I2.3percentofexpendi-
tures postponed over a period of twoquatters.
Empirical evidence also supports the hypothesis
of a strong positive correlation· between· the .a
priori estimate ofthe degree of pollu.ti()Il~corittol
impact on an industry, as indicated bythe ratio
of anti-pollution to total capital spending, •and
the actual percentages of expenditures delayed
as a result of pollution-control standards.
Direct pecuniary costs ofcourseareinvolvedin
satisfying government mandated regulations.
But in addition, the lengthening of the time
frame of investment spending because of pollu-
tion-control standards represents an important
secondary cost on industry through its tendency
to lower the rate of capital formation.
Table A1
PollutionControliExpenditures As
Percentage otTotal Capital Spending
by Industry,. 1970-76'
Average
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1970-76
"Regulated" aggregate 7.7 12.2 14.5 15.1 13.7 16.8 15.5 14.0
Primary iron and steel 10.3 12.8 12.3 11.7 9.3 14.9 11.5 13.1
Primary non-ferrous metals 8.1 10.3 15.3 18.0 28.3 25.5 20.4 18.3
Chemicals and allied products 4.9 8.2 10.9 10.2 7.3 8.9 12.3 9.0
Paper and allied products 9.3 20.6 23.3 22.8 16.6 21.9 25.7 20.0
Petroleum 6.0 9.0 10.7 12.7 7.2 12.8 7.5 9.4
"Control" aggregate 3.8 3.2 3.1 3.7 4.1 4.5 6.1 4.1
Electrical machinery and equipment 2.3 2.3 2.8 3.7 2.3 4.2 4.8 3.2
Other non-durable goods 5.5 1.0 5.0 3.1 2.2 1.4 2.2 2.9
Textile mill products 2.3 3.3 2.6 3.5 5.4 8.9 12.6 5.5
Transportation equipment (excluding motor vehicles) 5.0 6.2 2.0 4.3 6.4 3.5 4.0 4.6













0.8 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.4
1972 1973 1974 1975
36.3 36.5 33.5 48.4
4.3 3.6 3.5 7.2
4.0 5.3 9.5 8.2
8.4 8.0 6.0 7.2
7.1 7.5 6.2 8.4
12.5 12.2 8.3 17.5
,...
'J "1 o A 2.4 '.J k."
1.4 1.8 0.9 1.2
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1




















Pollution Control Expenditures as Percentage
Of Total Industrial Anti-Pollution Spending
by Industry, 1967-76'
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
43.2 43.7 "Reguiated" Aggregate
Primary iron and steel
Primary non·ferr()us metals
Chemicals and allied products
Paper and allied products
Petroleum
"Control" Aggregate





* Calculations based on "Annual McGraw-Hili Survey of Pollution Control Expenditures," Economics Dept., McGraw-Hill Publications Co.
50FOOTNOTES
SSRT-(SSRt + SSR2) / Z
where T1 and T2 are the Sum of observations in the eariy and
later subsamples. SSRT is the sum of obsEirvations in thEi early
and later subsamples. SSR 1and SSRZ are the sums of squared
residuals in the early and later Subsamples. and Z is the number
of independent variables. For an explanation ofthis test statistic
see F. M. Fisher. "Tests of Equality BetweEin SEits of Coeffi·
cients in Two Linear Regressions: An Expository Note." Econo-
metrica (March 1970). pp. 361-366. Since three·parameter
distributions are estimated by fourth·degree polynomials, the
critical =2.36 for the "Regulafed" 5 5
F 63 = 1.62, F 63
aggregate, and F 4
"Control" aggregate.
ThuS,there is no evidence for rejecting our null-hypothesis that
the wi are polynomially distributed. (For a description of this F·
test see P. J. Dhrymes, op. cit. p. 227-229.)
21. The appropriate test statistics is defined by
F[Z. Tt + T2 2Zj
that. the distributed lags will subtract the average cancellation in
every quarter.
11. M. Cohen. op. cit., p. 305.
12. M. Cohen. op. cit., p. 305.
13. See Almon. op. cit., p. 190.
14. M. Cohen. op. cit., p. 306.
15. "Regulated" industries are chiefly engaged in primar)'and
intermediate-stage processing. whose production faciliti€l.s tend
to. be more. energy intensive .'han theinterl11
ediate·and ad·
vanced·stage. proc~ssingindustriescompo~ing the."Control"
group. Hence, the imp~ctof the energy crisis on investment
spending could be greaterfor the "Regulated" groupthan.for the
"Control" group.Totest thispossibility, a dummy variabl" .....it~a
value equal to one during the period 19731-1.~7.6IVand z"ro
elsewhere was included in the twO aggregate regressions esti-
mated over the sample period 19531-1.976IV. Although the sign
of the dummy variable was negative. as expected, the estimated
coefficient was insignificantly different from zero at the 95 per·
cent confidence level. That the dummy variable was statistically
insignificant for both the "Regulated" and "Control" aggregates
indicates that the backlogs variable eff~ctively adjusted
expenditures for the impact of the energy crisis.
16. S. Almon. op. cit., pp. 187-189 and J. Popkin, op. cit., pp.
720-721.
17. McGraw·Hili. op. cil.
18. For the period 1967-73, the percentage of capacity shut·
~owr\SdueitoenVir~?(l\entalandsafetYregulations was .0.51
percent for our "Regulated" group, 0.13 percent for our."Con-
trol" group, and 0.35 percent for the twenty industries contained
itt the'>particular McGraw-Hili.survey. (Calculations. based .on
"Annual McGraw·HiII Survey of Pollution Control Expenditures,"
op. cit.)
19. "The choice.ofan appropri~te speCification fora distributed
lag function. .is a multiple decision problem of great complex·
ity,No formal statistical procedure is aVailable for)sucha prob-
lem..•so that the choice mustbe made onsof1)ebasi!; otherthan
testing of a !;tatistical hypothesis." Jorgenson and.Stephenson.
op. cit.
20. A comparisonofthe sums ofsquaredresiduals9lan9rpi-
nary least-squarEisregression model against the sums. of
squared residuals fronl bur 4th degree polynornial distributed-
lag regression yields
'The Distributed Lag Between Capital Appropriations and Ex-
penditures·... Econometrica, Vol. 34. No.3.) incorporating a
cancellations variable in regression equations conforming to the
above specification. and also in variable lag specifications.
found the variable to be statistically insignificant. This was prob·
ably due to the impossibility of determining to which periods' ap-
propriations the cancellations apply. We therefore do not
include a cancellations variable in our equalion. with the result
1. For description of the specific purposes and function of each
law. see Murray L. Weidenbaum. Government-Mandated Price
Increases: A NeglectedAspectofInflation (Washington. D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research. 1975).
2. "Plant and Equipment: Spending for Pollution Abatement To
Increase 11 Percent This Year." Daily Report for Executives,
May 24. 1977; "Regulators: A Rising Clamor Over Noise Limits."
Business Week, June 30. 1975. p.34.
3. For examples see Leonall C. Anderson. "Is There a Capital
Shortage: Theory and Recent Empirical Evidence." Journal of
Finance, May 1976; Anne P. Carter. "Energy. Environment. and
Economic Growth." Bell Journal of Economic and Manage-
ment Science, Autumn 1974; John Cremeans and Frank W. Se·
gel. "National Expenditures for Pollution Abatement and Control
1972." Survey of Current Business, February 1975; and 8e·
atrice N. Vaccara. A Survey of Fixed Capital Requirements of
the Business Economy, 1971-1980 (Washington: U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1975).
4. Gene Conatser (Economist for Bank of America) before the
(California) Assembly Permanent Subcommittee on Employment
and Economic Development. October 1977. Extract from Laura
R. Mitchel. "A Barometer Reading Of California's Business CIi·
mate." California Journal, May 1977.
5. Calculated from data presented in Annual McGraw·Hili Sur·
vey of Pollution Control Expenditures. This 41-percentfigure be-
comes 61 percent if the electric·utilities industry is included in
the calculation. However. that industry could not be included be·
cause of non·comparability of data.
6. L. M. Koyck. Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis
(Amsterdam: North Holland. 1954); F. deLeeuw. "The Demand
for Capital Goods by Manufacturers: A Study of Quarterly Time
Series." Econometrica (July 1962). pp. 407-23; T. Mayer. "The
Inflexibility of Monetary Policy." Review of Economics and
Statistics (November 1958). pp. 359-74; R. Eisner. "Invest·
mente Fact and Fancy," American Economic Review (May
1963); P.W. Jorgenson and J.A. Stephenson. "Investment Be-
havior in U.S. Manufacturing. 1947-1960." Econometrica (April
1967).
7. B. G. Hickman, Investment Demand and U.S. Growth
(Washington D.C.. Brookings Institution 1965). p. 33.
8. M. Cohen. "The National Industrial Conference Board Survey
of Capital Appropriations:' in The Quality and Economic Sig-
nificanceofAnticipations Data, Universities-National Bureau
Conference 10 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).
9. For a description of the polynomial distributed·lag regression
technique see S. Almon. "The Distributed Lag Between Capital
Appropriations and Expenditures," Econometrica (January
1965). pp. 178-196. Recent evidence offered by P.J. Dhrymes
and others suggests that the imposition of this assumption may
cause biases in estimation. Comparison of the sums of squared
residuals of an ordinary least-squares regression model against
the sums of squared residuals for our polynomial distributed·lag
regression indicates no evidence in support of the alternative
hypothesis that estimated wi should be unconstrained. (The re-
sults of our tests are presented in Footnote 20).
10, Previous studies (Almon, [9], and J. Popkin, "Comment on
51number of independent variables associated with the regression
term
n
2: WiAt-i remains constant at 3 regardless of the Value oln.
i=o
22. The mean lag (El) is defined as:
n





23. The mean lag (0) of the percentage of appropriations spent
is calculated at 3.912 for the "Regulated" group aggregate and
1.963 for the "Control" group aggregate.
24. A concomitant test of independence, using the alternative
hypothesis of positive correlation between the two sets of rank-
ings, is significant at the two-percent level. For a description of
these tests, see E. Lehman, Nonparametrics; Statistical Meth-
ods Based on Ranks. (San Francisco: Holden-Day Inc., 1975),
pp. 297-303.
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